all the barbarian peoples of northwestern Europe (The Geography IV.I.14). The term Celt was never applied by classical authors to the inhabitants of Britain or Ireland, although we now know that these insular peoples spoke dialects similar to those of continental Gaul before the latter peoples gradually abandoned their mother tongue in favor of Latin. Scholars today usually reserve the term Celtic to designate a group of closely related languages of the Indo-European family that were spoken in the first millennium B.C. over large portions of central and western Europe and that are now spoken only in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and Brittany.3 This linguistic unity was recognized only in the 18th century and well documented only in the 19th century.4 Ironically, if Strabo is correct in his etymology of the term Celtic, it is quite possible that the original Celts may have spoken Ligurian rather than the language that their name has subsequently come to signify (Greene 1964:14) .
Speakers of these languages are portrayed in historical texts of the classical world and in the much later heroic and legal literature of early Christian Ireland. They are also represented in the archaeological record of the Iron Age by the remnants of their material culture, settlements, and burials (Collis 1984; Moscati 1991). Certain aspects of Iron Age material culture, such as the well-known La Tene art styles (Megaw and Megaw 1989), exhibit considerable similarity over wide regions. However, much of the material culture shows a great deal of local variation over both time and space, and it would be misleading to speak of anything as homogeneous as a unified "Celtic culture" that could be linked isomorphically to a linguistic community or population. For example, it is not possible to assume that all peoples represented in the archaeological record by La Tene material culture spoke Celtic languages or that all ancient Celtic speakers participated in the La Tene material culture complex; there is, at best, a rather general correlation. It is more appropriate to think of ancient Celtic speakers in terms of a fluid network of autonomous societies speaking a set of related languages, linked by exchange, and differentially sharing certain cultural elements, but exhibiting considerable variation in political organization and other sociocultural structures and practices resulting from local trajectories of historical development. It is doubtful that the peoples of these diverse societies ever had a cohesive collective identity or ethnonym, and they clearly never constituted a unified political community. The Gaul portrayed by Caesar on the eve of his conquest consists of a series of named tribal polities linked through patron-client relations into a shifting configuration of unstable alliances engaged in mutual hostilities (Crumley 1987) . The term Celtic is clearly a dubious candidate for an indigenous ethnonym for the peoples that constitute the raw material from which Celtic identity has been fashioned in modern Europe. It first entered the historical record as an alien classificatory concept used in ancient Mediterranean states, projecting an outsider's sense of uniformity upon diverse peoples. Gradually, as contact with these peoples increased, this sense of uniformity was bolstered by generalizations about character, customs, and physical appearance. These generalizations were based in part on observations made in a few limited areas, but also largely on prejudices born of the conceptualization of "barbarians" as a necessary source of contrast for self-definition as "civilized" Greeks and Romans.5 In the course of modem European history, this classical conceptualization has been influential in the reinvention of two types ofessentializing concepts of Celticity. Sometimes Celtic identity has been constructed as a means of classifying "others" and ascribing characteristics to them that serve as a means of self-defining contrast, as in the case of English prejudices concerning the Irish and Scots (Chapman 1978 (Chapman , 1982 Curtis 1968) . However, as in the cases examined in this article, Celticism has also been adopted and developed indigenously as a concept of ethnic self-identity, often relying heavily on more positive readings of these same alien stereotypical images from the ancient classical world.
French Nationalism and Celtic Identity
Let us begin the analysis of Celticism with a consideration of the role of Celtic identity in French nationalism. Postrevolutionary France is a classic case of the state preceding the nation and then having to forge a sense of national identity for an invented community of people who had little in common except a political bond and who did not even speak the same language. Naturalization of this invented sense of popular unity required establishing sentiments of authenticity through appeals to the antiquity of a common ethnic heritage. Given the history of France, there are three major strands of ethnic identity that could have been drawn upon. Each of these was invoked in the struggle for power by which the French nation was formed and transformed, and it is revealing to examine which of these identities was emphasized at different periods by different social groups, factions, and classes in the construction of a French nationalist tradition.6 One possibility was provided by the people after whom the country is named: the Franks. These were Germanic-speaking peoples who penetrated Gaul in the waning days of the Roman Empire and established the Merovingean dynasty in the fifth century A.D. (James 1988). The other two possibilities were the Iron Age Celts (or Gauls) and the Romans who conquered them in the first century B.C.
Frankish identity was jealously monopolized by the nobility and royalty until the Revolution of 1789. By tracing their roots and the birth of the nation back to the fifth-century reign of the Frankish king Clovis, the nobility were able to assert the legitimacy of their rule through its supposed origin in the right of conquerors over the mass of subject commoners. The fact that Clovis converted to Christianity provided the monarchy with convenient connections to the church and divine sanction of its rule. This naturalization of class distinction through appeals to differences of ethnic identity tended to take on a strongly racial character, as in the influential historical writings of the Comte de Boulainvilliers (1727). He repeatedly asserted that France was composed of two races of people: the nobility, who were the descendants of the Franks, and the Third Estate, who were descended from the Gallo-Romans. The former were, by virtue of conquest, "the only people recognized as lords and masters" (Boulainvilliers 1727, 111:84). As Barzun (1932) and Poliakov (1971) have pointed out, this concept served to bolster the objections of Boulainvilliers and his peers to the creeping social mobility whereby bourgeois commoners ("Gauls") were being promoted by the king into positions among the nobility. Despite the rare objections of skeptics such as Voltaire, the historical and philosophical literature of the time reflects a general acceptance among intellectuals of the ethnic construction of class.
This invented ethnic/racial dichotomy, ideologically underpinning the class structure, formed an obvious focus of popular countermobilization with the outbreak of the Revolution of 1789. Celtic identity was used both to oppose the nobility in a revolution represented as a racial conflict and, subsequently, as a unifying theme in the new process of popular nationalism by which the nation was defined as a community. For example, the Abbe de Sieyes (1789) urged that those claiming to be a race of conquerors should be "sent back to the forests of Franconia" by the Third Estate in order to purge the nation, which would then be "constituted solely of the descendants of the Gauls and Romans."
The revolutionary leaders, having disposed of the Franks as a legitimate source of ethnic identity for the new republican nation, were faced with crafting a new popular tradition out of the heritage of the ambivalent relationship between the ancient Celts and their Roman conquerors. The dynamic tension of this relationship, which a later writer likened to the "two poles necessary for electricity" (Schrader 1898: Bronze statue of Vercingetorix by Millet (1865), erected at the site of Alesia. The statue was commissioned by Napoleon HI, and the face is modeled after his.
of Caesar while at the same time founding the Museum of National Antiquities. He also financed excavations at three of the main Iron Age settlements that had witnessed major events during the revolt of Vercingetorix: Alesia (the site of the final Celtic defeat), Gergovia (the site of a victory of the Celts over Caesar), and Bibracte (where Vercingetorix attempted to rally united opposition against the Romans). From his personal treasury he commissioned the sculptor Millet to create at Alesia a monumental bronze statue of Vercingetorix with the face modeled after his own (see Figure 1 ). Napoleon's choice of Alesia (rather than Gergovia or Bibracte) as the site for the statue reveals his conception of the identity of the French nation and of the utility of this ancient conflict as a national symbol. It was, as he saw it, the site both of heroic self-sacrifice by the Gauls in defense of their nation and of the ultimately beneficial, if temporarily painful, victory of Roman "civilization" over "barbarism." As he wrote, In honoring the memory of Vercingetorix, we must not lament his defeat. Let us admire the ardent and sincere love of this Gallic chief for the independence of his country, but let us not forget that it is to the triumph of the Roman armies that our civilization is due. [Napoleon III 1866:397] While admitting that Roman domination was accomplished "across streams of blood, it is true," he concluded that it "led these peoples to a better future" (Napoleon III 1866:397). This notion of the ultimate transformative benefits of the Roman enrichment of a proud barbarian people served as a subtle and convenient rationalization for expanding French colonial hegemony in Indochina, North Africa, and other overseas locations, while at the same time emphasizing, on the model of the Gauls, the wisdom and benefits of native submission to this heir of the Roman Empire. As a secondary school text of the period succinctly put it, "The Gauls had sufficient intelligence to understand that civilization is better than barbarism" (quoted in Gerard 1982:361). An informal survey by Goudineau (1990) suggests that this perspective on the Roman conquest is still influential.
At the same time that Alesia was being transformed into a physical symbol of colonial legitimacy, Vercingetorix, the fulcrum of this historical moral lesson, was being promoted to the role of an increasingly popular embodiment of French patriotism and national character. It was also during this period that Vercingetorix began appearing in French schoolbooks for the first time, along with the conceptualization of national identity encapsulated in the cliche "our ancestors the Gauls." History became a mandatory subject in French primary schools only in 1867, two years after the erection of the statue of Vercingetorix at Alesia. The philosophy of primary education, which had a profound influence on the mass of the French population, favored instruction of national history through a focus on heroes and dramatic events. Vercingetorix became the seminal French national hero (Amalvi 1982). In special popularized texts by Celtophile historians, this primary historical education was accompanied by heroic drawings of "our ancestors" (Guizot 1872; Martin 1865). All these artistic and educational media served to widely diffuse and fix firmly in the popular imagination this invented tradition of national identity. An ironic byproduct of the educational system under French colonial administration is that generations of Vietnamese and African children also grew up reciting the phrase "our ancestors the Gauls. Race remained a powerful theme throughout the 19th and into the 20th century. It was prominent in the widely influential writings of the Romantic historians Guizot (1820), Thierry (1866), and Martin (1852), and it was lent further legitimacy by the writing of early physical anthropologists such as Broca (1873) and Topinard (1878). The latter, for example, stated that "the impulses inherent in the cerebral matter are so tenacious, in spite of education and civilisation, that they still continue after crossing and mixture of races, and are of assistance in recognizing them," concluding that "the predominating character of the French race is still that of the Gauls described by Caesar" (Topinard 1878:409). Much effort was also expended in attempting to define the physical characteristics of"the Celtic type," which, in contrast to the tall, dolichocephalic "Germanic race," was identified as short, dark, and brachycephalic (Broca 1873:591). Bretons were conceded to be an approximation of this type, but the purest living representatives, with a high brachycephalic index and a cranial capacity "considerably greater than that of Parisians," and with a physical type that "may be looked on as that of the people of Celtica at the time of Caesar and Strabo" (Topinard 1878:460), were held to be the inhabitants of the Auvergne, in the center of France. These Auvergnats were considered direct descendants of "the people who held firmly aloft the banner of national independence on the heights of Gergovia and Alesia."
CamilleJullian (1913), on the other hand, explicitly eschewed the racial perspective, arguing instead for the continuity of the political concept of a Celtic nation, a "patrie Gauloise," which had "motivated Vercingetorix" and which was the source of modem patriotic sentiment (Jullian 1913:68) . He believed that Gauls and Gaul "were the names of a people, of a nation constituted in a fixed territory, corresponding more or less to that of France," and that the inhabitants of that nation, although racially mixed, "sang together memories of their past and hopes for their future" (Jullian 1913 The European Community Perhaps the most ironic of the three cases examined here is the attempt to establish authenticity through links to Celtic antiquity for the newest and largest imagined community on the European scene, the European Community (EC). Over a dozen major exhibitions on Celtic archaeology have been mounted in Europe since 1980, most of them well financed, sponsored by more than one nation, and constructed with objects from a wide array of countries. The political theme of these exhibitions is rarely far from the surface, and it conforms perfectly to the strategy for the formation of an integrated European identity through emphasis on cultural heritage, as charted by the European Commission (Shore and Black 1992). An early exhibition, held in Steyr, Austria, was subtitled "An Early Form of European Unity," while the most recent, mounted in Venice in 1991, is entitled "The Celts: The First Europe."
The catalogues of these exhibits are peppered with allusions to the Celts as constituting "the ethnic and cultural foundation of most western peoples" (Otte 1987:11) . According to the catalogue of a recent Franco-Belgian exhibition on Celtic archaeology, The history of Europe begins with the Celts. The Celtic peoples were able to develop an original culture of great richness, the reflection of a singular spirit which will remain henceforward an essential component of the intellectual evolution of our countries. The multiform heritage of this 'First Europe' remains no less today one of the principal factors of our cohesion. [Kruta 1990:8] Perhaps most explicit of all is the Venice exhibit, the introduction to which states that it was conceived with a mind to the great impending process of the unification of western Europe, a process that pointed eloquently to the truly unique aspect of the Celtic civilization, namely its being the first historically documented civilization on a European scale.... We felt, and still feel, that linking that past to this present was in no way forced, but indeed essential, and could effectively call us back to our common roots. [Leclant and Moscati 1991:4] It remains to be seen how effective such appeals to Celtic identity will be in constructing and popularizing a sense of pan-European unity. Despite the claim that "it is commonly agreed that all European cultures can trace their roots to Celtic origins" (Benvenuti 1991:11), a logical interpretation of the archaeological evidence assembled in these exhibits would seem to exclude regions such as northern Germany and Scandinavia, which were never Celtic speaking and did not share in the La Tene material culture complex on view in the display cases. At the same time, it would necessarily include large areas of eastern Europe that are currently excluded from the EC but that (although of uncertain ancient linguistic affiliation) are central to the definition of La Tene material culture.
Another problem with a Celtic vision of European identity is that it would seem to particularly favor certain nations that already have well-developed nationalist myths of Celtic identity. France, for example, with its claim to be the embodiment of ancient Gaul and the "eldest daughter of la Celtique" (Johanneau 1807:42), might feel itself well placed to exercise a certain cultural hegemony within the EC. Indeed, Mitterrand's speech at Bibracte emphasized that, for the French, it was the site "where the first act of our history took place." But he also subtly noted that it was "one of the grand sites of Celtic civilization," a civilization that was "not defined by political boundaries but by common culture" and that "extended over the better part of Europe" (Mitterrand 1985:54).'4 If "the history of Europe begins with the Celts" and the Celts are the "First Europe," then one can easily imagine how the nation that claims Vercingetorix as a personification of its national character might perceive itself as the heart of that new and old Europe. On the other hand, this vision would be difficult to square with that of Breton activists, who interpret the last 2,500 years of European history as a bloody process of the "assassination 
Archaeology and Ethnic Nationalism
The ancient Celts, as the first "people" to emerge from the mists of European prehistory as a discrete category of identity by virtue of having a name applied to them, offer a wealth of possibilities for forging the symbolic and emotional links that bond people together in imagined communities. Language, places, objects, and persons have all been used to evoke antiquity and authenticity in the construction of traditions of communal identity for regions, nations, and supranational entities. Because such identities tend to be defined by contrast, different communities-or factions within communities--selectively stress and appropriate those aspects that symbolically highlight their own distinctiveness. The apparent paradox in the manipulation of Celtic identity is explained by the symbolically fecund ambiguities of the Celtic past and the mobile historical trajectories produced in the bricolage process of the construction of traditions as they are continually redefined in response to political demands (Abeles 1988; Crumley 1991).
Clearly, archaeological research in the Celtic domain is politically charged, and an awareness of the ramifications and historical situation of one's work is crucial. By the nature of their endeavor, archaeologists find themselves in an ambiguous and delicate position as both the furnishers of the symbolic hardware of invented traditions and the potential agents of deconstruction for those traditions. Archaeology provides for the popular imagination tangible connections to an identity rooted in the awe-inspiring past. Places and objects can be made into powerfully evocative symbols that serve to authenticate constructed traditions (Anderson 1983; Lowenthal 1985) . "The most effective expression of ethnicity requires an anchor to a particular geography" (Crumley 1991:3), and archaeology provides that anchor by tying sites to ancient events and people.
It is largely for this reason that nation-states take an interest in archaeology. "What makes a nation /s the past, what justifies one nation against another is the past" (Hobsbawm 1992:3). Hence the state is concerned to finance excavations, designate and preserve "national sites," and sponsor museums and exhibits that display the "national heritage." Moreover, given that the state is the major owner of the means of production for archaeological research, it is hardly surprising that the pattern of support for archaeological excavation and museum displays has been conditioned by national mythologies of identity. This was most blatantly clear in the projects of Napoleon I and Napoleon III, but it is also subtly operative in the demands placed on archaeologists today as they seek to justify the significance of their sites in the competitive process of requesting grants for excavation or in attempting to protect the archaeological record. Because state functionaries must balance considerations of scientific importance with the potential of sites as national symbolic resources, archaeologists can ill afford to neglect emphasizing the latter. However, one cannot hope to understand the development of what Trigger (1984) has called "nationalist archaeology" by simple reference to a uniform national ideology or set of national interests. Nation-states are not monolithic entities but dynamic social phenomena born of and propelled by the struggle among competing factions. The subtle demands that condition a nationalist archaeology are likely to be shaped by complex, historically evolving, factional contests as much as by overarching state interests.
Archaeologists attempting to critically examine and challenge the incorporation of the past into invented traditions face other difficulties aside from state control of research funds. In the first place, although impressed by professional expertise and intrigued with the objects and monuments archaeologists bring to light, the public often pays little heed to the caveats voiced by archaeologists about the interpretation of these items. This is particularly the case with artistic creations and popular folk traditions. For example, 19th-century Romantic statues and paintings of Gauls are replete with weapons and armor copied carefully from archaeological specimens on view in museums. 
THE MANIPULATION OF CELTIC IDENTITY
Another difficulty facing archaeologists, in the wake of a growing critical awareness of the problematic nature of the archaeological endeavor, has been a loss of confidence in the authority of their interpretations. The problem is not only that the archaeological record is partial and inherently ambiguous but also that archaeologists themselves are products of a particular sociohistorical context and that their interpretations and evaluations of plausibility are not independent of that context, a fact of which they have become increasingly aware.
In the case of the Celts, reconstructions of Celtic history and customs prior to the 19th century had been based almost entirely on interpretations of the alien testimony of classical texts. Archaeology appears to offer the promise of restoring the indigenous voice of the Celts by allowing their material culture, their own creations, to speak directly to later generations. However, this apparent communication is an act of interpretation by modern scholars. As such it remains an alien perspective subject to caveats that include, most critically, a realization of the social situation in which interpretations are formed.
Clearly, archaeologists must continually strive to be self-critical in evaluating the social and political contexts of their interpretive perspectives and their epistemological tools. 16 Examples of the unwitting (or sometimes conscious) participation of historians and archaeologists in the manipulation of the past in the cause of ethnic, nationalist, and colonialist mythologies illustrate the risks of unreflective interpretation and the illusion of objectivity.17 Moreover, the fact that archaeology came of age as a professional discipline precisely in the context of the development of modem nation-states, with their demands for the construction of popular traditions of identity, should give cause for serious examination of the social construction of the field. Sensitivity to alternative conceptions of the past-especially those of disenfranchised groups-is both necessary and desirable (Layton 1989; Murray 1993) . But the dangerous abuses and distortions of the archaeological record promulgated in Nazi Germany to justify territorial expansion and genocide'8 are a warning of the potential consequences of a failure to refute certain interpretations as seriously wrong. Popular traditions of regional ethnicity may seem to be a more benign manipulation of the past, but the violent effects of ethnic conflict, fueled by visions of identity rooted in emotionally charged appeals to the distant past, are readily apparent in Europe today.
If many archaeologists no longer feel comfortable imposing authoritative interpretations, we at least have a duty to engage in critically reflective debate about the manipulation of the past and to expose the profoundly ahistorical nature of essentialist visions of identity to the archaeological record of constant change. The case of "our ancestors the Gauls" offers a compelling example of the delicate challenge that faces archaeologists in sorting out the relationship between how the past has produced the present and how the present invents and manipulates its past. 
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